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This paper analyzes the choice between different external technology sourcing activities of a 
firm. On one hand, the firm can acquire new technology which is embodied in personnel. On the 
other hand, the firm can obtain new technology disembodied through a licensing agreement or 
by outsourcing the technology development from an R&D contractor. Building on Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2006), we test whether embodied and disembodied technology acquisitions are 
complementary activities or rather behave as substitute technology acquisition alternatives. We 
find that while internal and external technology acquisition are complementary innovation 
activities, the actual choice of external technology sourcing between embodied or disembodied 
modes is substitutive for smaller firms. The evidence for larger firms suggests that different 
external technology sourcing activities are complementary, but in this case the results are 
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Today, even the largest and most technologically self-sufficient organizations require 
knowledge from beyond their boundaries. In addition to doing own research and development, 
firms typically tap knowledge sources external to the firm by various means such as licensing, 
contracting out R&D, acquisitions of other firms and attracting qualified researchers embodying 
relevant knowledge (Arora and Gambardella, 1994; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Granstrand 
et al., 1992). Furthermore, they can cooperate actively in R&D with other firms and research 
organizations and/or attempt to absorb existing technology without any explicit involvement 
or permission from the innovator.  
While most of the theoretical literature has focused on the choice between different innovation 
activities as substitutes, particularly the technology make and buy decision, the joint occurrence 
of these innovation activities at the firm level is suggestive of complementarity between these 
activities. A growing empirical literature has documented the complementarity between 
technology make and buy (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Belderbos et al., 2004; Arora and 
Gambardella, 1994). Own internal know-how will increase the marginal return to external 
knowledge acquisition strategies.  This is reminiscent of the notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ 
introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), stressing the importance of a stock of prior 
knowledge to effectively scan, screen and absorb external know-how.  At the same time, the 
access to external know-how may leverage the efficiency of internal R&D activities.   
Relatively few studies have focused on other parts of the innovation strategy. Belderbos et al. 
(2004) examine the substitute versus complementary relationship between various types of 
cooperative agreements. Arora and Gambardella (1990) examine complementarity among four 
different external sourcing strategies of large chemical and pharmaceutical firms in 
biotechnology (agreements with other firms, with universities, investments in NTBFs and 
acquisitions of NTBFs). They find evidence for the joint occurrence of all types of external 
sourcing strategies, even after correcting for a set of firm characteristics.    
                                              
∗ Both authors acknowledge support from the Flemish Government (SOOS), the first author from the Spanish Ministry 
of Education (SEJ2006-11833/ECON), the second author from DWTC (IUAP P5/11/33) and KULeuven (OT/04/07A). 
Bruno Cassiman is a fellow of the SPSP Research Center at IESE Business School.  
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In this study, we take a closer look at the relationship between various external technology 
acquisition strategies for a set of innovative companies across all manufacturing sectors, drawn 
from the Community Innovation Survey for Belgium. We distinguish two broad types of external 
technology sourcing decisions by the firm. On one hand, the firm can acquire new technology 
which is embodied in new personnel that is attracted to it. On the other hand, the firm can obtain 
new technology disembodied through a licensing agreement or by outsourcing the technology 
development from an R&D contractor. Using the methodology developed in Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2006), we systematically examine the substitute versus complementary relationship 
between these two different types of technology acquisition. Going beyond the mere 
identification of the relationship, the analysis also focuses on the contextual variables affecting 
this perceived relationship. We find that while internal and external technology acquisitions are 
complementary, the actual choice of external acquisition between embodied or disembodied 
modes is substitutive for smaller firms. Larger firms tend to combine these different external 
technology sourcing strategies, but complementarity effects are not significant. 
The next section reviews the literature on technology buy decisions. Section 3 describes our 
sample and section 4 presents the results on who buys technology and how they organize these 
transactions. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Technology Buy: Theory  
The existing literature on the decision to buy technologies is mostly focused on the “make versus 
buy” decision. Less theory exists on comparing different modes of acquiring technology. This 
section reviews the economic theory on technology buy and scans the technology management 
literature on advantages and disadvantages of the various modes of technology acquisition. 
In the economics literature, technology acquisition is typically of the disembodied kind, 
through licensing (in case of “off the shelf” technologies) or R&D contracting (if the know-how 
still needs to be developed). Building further on the general literature on make or buy decisions, 
i.e. transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) and property rights theory (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986), the theoretical framework for explaining disembodied acquisition stresses the 
advantage of tapping existing, often more specialized knowledge, if available. This leads to 
time gains and lower innovation costs, at least if the market for disembodied technologies is 
sufficiently developed. However, disembodied acquisition may create considerable transaction 
costs, ex ante in terms of search and negotiation costs and ex post to enforce contracts. The 
typical uncertain n a t u r e  o f  R &D projects exacerbates these transaction costs. Hence, 
disembodied acquisition is more likely to occur for generic, non-firm specific, already 
sufficiently standardized know-how (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). 
Beyond disembodied technology acquisition, external know-how can also be accessed, without 
any explicit involvement from the sending party (Arrow, 1962).  The channels through which 
such “spillovers” occur are many, ranging from informal communications networks, meetings, 
input suppliers and customers, patent applications, reverse engineering, and mobility of 
researchers.
1 An extensive theoretical literature in Industrial Organization has developed around 
the effects of such spillovers on the incentives for investment in R&D, shedding further light on 
the relationship between technology buy and make.  Whether spillovers and own R&D will act 
                                              
1 Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) develop a model for endogenizing spillovers through the labor market for R&D 
employees.  
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as substitutes or complements depends on the competition regime, the need for absorptive 
capacity and the strength of the appropriability regime (see De Bondt, 1997, for a review).   
The  technology management literature further clarifies the drivers of the choice between 
technology buy and make. It emphasizes as advantages of external sourcing the option to get 
quick access to technological know-how, which is important when the firm lacks familiarity 
with, or competence in, the new market/technology. At the same time, this already indicates a 
major roadblock to external sourcing, namely, matching the existing technological capabilities 
of the receiving firm with the transmission capacity of the source. Chatterji (1996) pinpoints as 
a general problem in external sourcing strategies an insufficient “post-agreement” management 
and commitment to the external sourcing strategy. To overcome the extra costs of external 
sourcing, an organizational structure that builds in absorptive capacity and is able to overcome 
the classic “not invented here” syndrome is an important asset. Allen (1977) suggests the use of 
technological gatekeepers to improve the external sourcing strategy, as a way of bridging the 
gap between internal and external environment.   
Beyond the choice between make and buy, the technology management literature also discusses 
the choice among the various external sourcing modes.  When choosing the mode of external 
sourcing, ranging from acquisition to majority-minority holdings to networking and short-term 
contracting, firms have to trade off commitment and control versus flexibility (Roberts and 
Berry, 1985). More flexible modes are more attractive for ill-defined, embryonic technology 
with a high level of risk and with which the company is unfamiliar, while higher 
control/ownership modes are more important when appropriation is weak, assets are specialized 
and the technology is highly relevant for sustaining a competitive advantage.   
In addition, the appropriability regime will influence the selection of the external innovation 
activity (Teece, 1986). When appropriability is high, firms are willing to sell their technology to 
other firms to appropriate the benefits from innovating. Hence, firms that decide to acquire 
technology externally, will find it easier to acquire this technology in disembodied form such as 
through licensing agreements or R&D contracts. Loose appropriation environments quickly 
erode a firm’s technological advantage. In that case, firms will develop specialized 
complementary assets internally to protect their technology. This is reminiscent of the 
“resource-based” view of the firm that stresses the imperfect mobility of resources as a 
condition for sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage. Firms that decide to acquire 
technology externally in this environment, acquire this technology in embodied form through 
the acquisition of other firms or by attracting specialized personnel. 
To summarize, most of the existing literature, both economics and management, discusses 
external sourcing motives individually or in relationship with internal sourcing. If a 
relationship is suggested, it is mostly in the form of substitute choices for acquiring knowledge.  
However, instead of discussing “make or buy” or buying modes as substitutes, the potential for 
combining sourcing modes as complementary innovation strategies should not be ignored. 
Although one strategy may substitute for the other at the project level, combining sourcing 
creates extensive scope for complementarities, particularly at the firm level, across projects. If 
combining different sourcing strategies increases the efficiency of each sourcing strategy, they 
are more likely to be observed in combination. But which conditions need to be present to 
realize the scope for complementarity? Arora and Gambardella (1994) identify internal 
knowledge capabilities which allow effective use of foreign know-how, stimulating external 
sourcing. Internal capabilities generate an ability to better screen available external projects. 
Once developed within the firm, this capacity will lead to a more focused search, which may  
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reduce or stimulate various external sourcing activities.  In any case, internal capabilities are 
needed to lead and support the external sourcing effort. Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) identify 
the reliance on basic R&D – as measured by the importance of universities and research centers 
as an information source for the innovation process – as an important contextual variable 
affecting complementarity between internal and external innovation activities. In a similar 
spirit, firms which have developed basic R&D capabilities may be more prolific in developing 
several external sourcing strategies simultaneously. 
Large firms can be expected to be less likely to buy on a larger scope and scale, to the extent 
that scale advantages in R&D can be realized in-house. To the extent that large firms have own 
in-house R&D with better absorptive capacities, they are better tuned to benefit from external 
sourcing (see Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Gambardella, 1992; and Cockbur and Henderson, 
1998 for evidence on this from the pharmaceuticals industry). The specific problems of SMEs in 
establishing external linkages are tackled in Rothwell and Dodgson (1991). These authors again 
stress that a SME’s ability to access external know-how is conditioned by its in-house 
employment of qualified technical specialists, scientists and engineers. 
3. Measuring Complementarity (Supermodularity) or 
Substitutability (submodularity) 
3.1. A framework for assessing complementarity/substitutability 
The notion of fit or complementarities between activities thrives in the management literature, 
but often as an ill-defined concept. Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), we define 
complementarity explicitly building further on the theory of supermodularity (see Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990 and 1995). This elegant mathematical theory states the necessary conditions for 
activities to be complementary.  
Suppose there are 2 activities A1 and A2, each activity can be done by the firm (Ai = 1) or 
not (Ai = 0) and i ∈{1, 2}. The function Π(A1, A2) is supermodular and A1 and A2 are 
complements only if:  
Π(1, 1) - Π(0, 1) ≥ Π(1, 0) - Π(0, 0), 
 i.e. adding an activity while already performing the other activity has a higher incremental 
effect on performance (Π) than when doing the activity in isolation. 
Furthermore, the same mathematical theory defines submodularity and substitutability when 
the sign is reversed, i.e.  
The function Π(A1, A2) is submodular and A1 and A2 are substitutes only if:  
Π(1, 1) - Π(0, 1) ≤ Π(1, 0) - Π(0, 0),   
 i.e. adding an activity while already performing the other activity has a lower incremental 
effect on performance (Π) than when doing the activity in isolation. 
Two interesting empirical predictions follow from this theory (See Arora, 1996; Athey and 
Stern, 1998). Two activities that are complementary will be positively correlated, while negative 
correlation is consistent with substitutes. Correlation, however, is neither necessary nor 
sufficient if the conditions specified supra do not hold, particularly if there are more than two 
activities to decide on (Arora, 1996). The main problem is that unobserved heterogeneity 
between different observations could bias the estimation results and can lead both to accepting  
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the complementarity (substitutability) hypothesis when none exists, or to rejecting the 
complementarity (substitutability) hypothesis when activities in fact are complementary 
(substitutes) (see Athey and Stern, 1998).    
The second result is the use of exclusion restrictions to assess the existence of complementarity 
(substitutes). Suppose that two different activities are complementary (substitute). Suppose 
further that there is an exogenous variable in the environment only affecting the likelihood of 
observing one activity.  Then, in addition to the positive direct effect of this variable on the 
choice of this one activity, we should also find a positive (negative) indirect effect on the other 
activity, because of the complementarity (substitution) between the two activities.  
3.2. Measuring complementarity/substitutability among external sourcing modes 
In order to test for the relation between different external sourcing activities of the firm, two 
different approaches present themselves: the productivity and the adoption approach. In the 
productivity approach, the nature of the relation is tested directly by regressing a measure of 
performance of the innovation process on exclusive combinations of our external sourcing 
activities. In particular, we create a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm acquired 
technology disembodied through licensing or R&D contracting (DEMB) or embodied by 
acquiring specialized personnel (EMB) – the firm’s external sourcing activities. From these 
dummy variables we construct different exclusive categories – the firm’s external sourcing 
strategy: firms that have no external sourcing (NoDEMB&EMB); firms that only buy 
disembodied (DEMBOnly); firms that only acquire technology embodied through personnel 
(EMBOnly); and firms that combine embodied and disembodied technology acquisition 
(DEMB&EMB).  
The innovation performance measure used is the percentage of sales that is generated from new 
or substantially improved products introduced in the past two years [Π(A1, A2)]. By restricting 
the performance measure to innovation performance only, rather than overall firm 
performance, we attempt to reduce the problem of having to correct for other sources of firm 
heterogeneity that influence overall performance. Furthermore, innovation performance has 
been linked to overall firm performance (o.a. Crépon et al., 1998). The test for complementarity 
(substitutability) between two innovation activities, A1 and A2, is:  
θ11 - θ10  ≥ (≤) θ01 - θ00           (1) 
with  kl θ  the coefficients on the innovation strategy choice of the firm. The proposed test 
follows directly from the theoretical development of complementarity/substitutability and 
establishes the existence of complementarity/substitutability conditional on having unbiased 
estimates for the θ-coefficients. A maintained assumption for this analysis to provide unbiased 
estimates is that the drivers of adoption decisions, A1 and A2, are uncorrelated with the error 
term ε
i.
2   
In the adoption approach, we test the nature of the relation between innovation activities 
through an exclusion restriction on a bivariate probit model. The bivariate probit regresses the 
non-exclusive innovation activities (DEMB and EMB) on assumed exogenous control variables 
(Z
i) but explicitly takes into account the correlation between them. We are particularly 
                                              
2 See Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) for an extensive discussion about this methodology and its underlying 
assumptions.  
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interested in variables that are expected to affect exclusively only one of the innovation 
activities, but still appear significantly in the other innovation activity, too.  
We also want to assess the factors affecting complementarity or substitutability of the external 
innovation activities. We estimate a multinomial logit model examining the drivers for the 
combinations of innovation activities (in casu: NoEMB&DEMB;  DEMBOnly;  EMBOnly; 
DEMB&EMB).  The multinomial logit model reveals drivers of exclusive combinations of the 
different external sourcing strategies. For a complementary relation we are interested in the 
drivers that affect the joint adoption of external sourcing activities, i.e. variables that show up 
significantly in the multinomial logit results for DEMB&EMB, while not being significant for 
other external sourcing strategy choices. For a substitute relation, we are interested in the 
drivers that affect the exclusive categories, i.e. variables that show up significantly in the 
multinomial logit results for DEMBOnly and/or EMBOnly while not being significant for other 
external sourcing strategy choices. 
To summarize, our empirical strategy for evaluating complementarity or substitutability in the 
external sourcing strategy follows three steps. First, we directly test for the nature of the 
relationship (complementarity/substitutability) as described in the productivity approach. 
Second, in an effort to understand the variables that affect the choice of different external 
sourcing strategies, we perform the multinomial logit. This analysis reveals different drivers of 
external sourcing activities and hints towards contextual variables affecting the joint adoption 
of external sourcing activities versus the exclusive adoption of such activities. In a third step, 
we use this latter information to refine our analysis for evaluating complementarity or 
substitutability by estimating a bivariate probit model using the drivers of innovation strategies 
that have been uncovered and testing a possible exclusion restriction.  
4. Sample 
The data used for this research are innovation data on the Belgian manufacturing industry that 
were collected as part of the Community Innovation Survey conducted by Eurostat in the 
different member countries in 1993. A representative sample of 1335 Belgian manufacturing 
firms was selected resulting in a response of 735 usable questionnaires. About 60% of the firms 
in the sample claim to innovate, while only 40% do not innovate. For the remainder of our 
analysis, we restrict attention to the innovation-active firms in the sample that performed 
internal R&D in 1992
3. Innovation-active firms are distinguished by their answer on the 
question whether they were actively engaged in introducing new or improved products or 
processes in the last two years. Our effective sample without missing values consists of 215 
observations.   
For this sample we can identify whether and how firms acquire new technology. Identification 
of external sourcing is based only on whether one of these external sourcing activities has been 
used or not. The CIS survey identifies several types of technology acquisition. First, the 
organization can acquire new technology that has to be assimilated by the organization. 
Disembodied technology acquisition strategies include licensing, R&D contracting and the use 
of technology consulting agencies. Second, new technology can be acquired that is embodied in 
the good or asset that is acquired: embodied technology acquisition. Such strategies include 
                                              
3 The sample of observations that contain information on external acquisition is restricted to innovation-active 
firms. Within this sample, almost all firms were simultaneously engaged in internal R&D.    
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acquisition of firms (take-overs), attracting qualified personnel and the purchase of equipment. 
Not included in the main analysis is the disembodied purchase of consulting services, the 
embodied purchase of equipment and the acquisition of other firms; the former two because 
probably not all of firms interpreted the question as buying with the explicit purpose of 
obtaining new technologies;
4 the latter because it is a very specific and too infrequently chosen 
activity in our sample.
5 This ultimately leaves us with DEMB acquisition through licensing 
and/or R&D contracting on one hand
6 and EMB acquisition through acquisition of skilled 
workers on the other hand. 
Table 1 summarizes the information about the firm’s external sourcing activities. Almost three 
quarters of the innovating firms acquire technology on the external market using at least one 
of the two possible external sourcing activities. Embodied and disembodied technology 
acquisitions are slightly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.07).
7 The positive 
correlation between the different external knowledge acquisition activities confirms the results 
from Arora and Gambardella (1990) in biotechnology. 
 
 
                                              
4 In addition, buying equipment from suppliers is clearly a different strategy, as noted by Pavitt (1984), who found 
that supplier-dominated industries are less R&D-intense and more process-oriented than other industries.  
5  Reported results are not sensitive for including in the EMB also acquisition of firms and in the DEMB also 
consulting.   
6 As reported infra, licensing and R&D contracting are highly positively correlated, which is why we have grouped 
them together in DEMB. Only including either licensing or R&D contracting individually as DEMB acquisition did not 
yield significantly different results from those reported here. 
7 Licensing and R&D Contracting have a correlation of about 0.29 (0.22 for firms with less than 250 employees; 0.29 
for firms with more than 250 employees) which is much higher than across embodied and disembodied acquisition 
strategies.  
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Table 1 
Frequency of External Technology Sourcing Activities and Pairwise correlation 
 
In the sample of innovative companies, about half of the firms have less than 250 employees. 
These small firms in particular are less likely to buy disembodied technology, i.e. R&D 
contracting and licensing. For these small firms, embodied and disembodied technology 
acquisition is actually (marginally) negatively correlated, while for large firms these external 
sourcing activities are positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.18). 
Table 2 analyses the frequency and performance of the exclusive external knowledge 
acquisition strategies. In the total sample, the absence of an external sourcing strategy 
(NoDEMB&EMB) clearly underperforms in terms of innovative output. The combination of both 
embodied and disembodied acquisition (DEMB&EMB) clearly improves on innovative 
performance, but the best performing external sourcing strategy seems to be the embodied 
acquisition only (EMBonly). This result is mainly driven by the small firms in the sample.   
Small firms (less than 250 employees) are significantly more likely to buy embodied knowledge 
only. The combination of external sourcing activities is much less likely for these firms. The 
EMBonly acquisition strategy also significantly outperforms the other activity combinations for 
the small firms when measuring the percentage of sales coming from new products. For large 
firms (more than 250 employees), a combination strategy works best. These first results seem to 
suggest that small firms face a substitute relation between external sourcing activities, while 
larger firms on the contrary might find these activities to be complementary within their 
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Table 2 
Frequency of External Technology Sourcing Strategies and Innovation Performance by Strategy 
 Total  Sample  Size ≤ 250  Size >250 
  Frequency    % Sales from 
New Products 
Frequency  % Sales from 
New Products 
Frequency  % Sales from 
New Products 
NoDEMB&EMP  59  13.25  33 (31%)  15.8  26 (24%)  10.0 
DEMB Only  62  17.4  25 (24%)  16.9  37 (34%)  17.7 
EMB Only  39  23.3  28 (26%)  25.8  11 (10%)  17.0 
DEMB&EMB  55  20.0  20 (19%)  16.5  35 (32%)  22.0 
Total  215  106  109  
 
5. Econometric results on who buys how? 
Our methodology to examine the substitute versus complementary relationship between 
embodied and disembodied technology acquisition consists of three steps. First, we directly test 
for complementarity/substitutability in the productivity analysis.  Second, we perform the 
multinomial logit in search of the variables that affect the choice between different external 
sourcing strategies. In a third step, we estimate a bivariate probit model using the drivers of 
external sourcing strategies that have been uncovered and test a possible exclusion restriction.  
5.1. The variables and hypotheses 
Productivity analysis:  the drivers of innovative performance 
First we analyze how combining external sourcing activities affects the performance of the 
innovation process. We regress our measure of innovation performance (% Sales from New 
Products)  on the exclusive combinations of external sourcing activities, together with firm 
characteristics and industry dummies that may affect the performance of the innovation 
process. Table 3 presents the definitions of these variables. 
Since Schumpeter’s work, the size of the firm has traditionally been an important control 
variable (see, among others, Cohen and Levin, 1989). On the one hand, larger firms may have 
higher market power or may enjoy economies of scale and scope, raising the profitability of an 
innovation strategy.  On the other hand, smaller firms are associated with less bureaucracy and 
so may be more innovation efficient (Acs and Audretsch, 1987). Or smaller innovative firms 
may just have it easier than large firms when it comes to increasing sales of new or 
substantially improved products as a percentage of their total sales. We measure size by the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees of the firm in 1992 (Size). In addition, we control 
for the inputs into innovation activities, i.e. innovation expenditures relative to sales. The 
questionnaire asked for the amount (in Belgian francs) spent on all innovation activities, 
including own R&D, licensing and R&D contracting, and other development activities. 
Innovation-intensive firms are likely to produce more innovations, thus making sales of new 
products a larger percentage of total sales (Innovation Intensity). Given that the profitability of 
an innovation strategy is likely to be affected by the competitiveness of the environment and  
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that exporting firms tend to encounter a more competitive environment, a firm’s export 
intensity (Export Intensity), i.e. the percentage of 1992 sales generated from exports, should 
positively affect innovation performance. Last of the generic firm-specific control variables are 
lack of technological opportunity (Technology Obstacles) and lack of market opportunities 
(Market Obstacles), as perceived by the firm. These exogenous factors capture, respectively, 
supply factors and demand factors affecting the scope for innovative performance. Both types 
of obstacles are expected to reduce innovation performance. In addition, we include industry 


























Variable Name  Variable Construction 
 
% Sales from New Products 
 (dependent variable) 
Percentage of total sales derived from new or substantially 
improved products introduced between 1990 and 1992. 
Employment  Natural Logarithm of Number of Employees of the firm in 1992. 
Innovation Intensity  Expenditure on innovation activities relative to Sales. 
Export Intensity  Export Intensity in 1992 (Exports/Sales x 0.1). 
Market Obstacles  Average measure of importance of lack of market information, 
no need for innovation because of previous innovations, 
problems with regulations, little interest in new products by 
customers, uncertainty about market timing, as a barrier to 
innovation (on scale 1, unimportant, to 5, crucial). 
Technological Obstacles  Importance of lack of technological opportunities as barrier to 
innovation (on scale 1, unimportant, to 5, crucial). 
Effectiveness of IP Protection   Measure of effectiveness of patents as a means for protecting 
innovation (firm-level measure on scale 1, unimportant, to 5, 
crucial). 
Effectiveness of Strategic Protection  Average measure of effectiveness of secrecy, complexity and/or 
lead time as a means for protecting innovation (on scale 1, 
unimportant, to 5, crucial). 
Basic R&D Reliance  Measure of importance for the innovation process of information 
from research institutes and universities relative to the 
importance of suppliers and customers as an information 
source. 
Resource Limitations  Importance of lack of innovation and technical personnel as a 
barrier to innovation (on scale 1, unimportant, to 5, crucial). 
Financial Limitations 
Sum of scores of importance of following obstacles to innovation 
process (number between 1, unimportant, and 5, crucial): (1) No 
suitable financing available, (2) High costs of innovation, (3) 
Pay-back period too long, (4) Innovation cost hard to control. 
(rescaled between 0 and 1). 
IndEMB and IndDEMB  Average industry level of EMB/DEMB technology sourcing in 2-
digit NACE* industry. 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMIES 
Industry dummies are included where the industry is defined as groupings of NACE2* digit 
level industries: Steel (Nace 22, 9 obs), Minerals (Nace 24, 11 obs), Chemicals (Nace 25 
and 26 excluding 2571/2572, 30 obs), Pharmaceuticals (Nace 2571/2572, 6 obs), Metals 
& Metal products (Nace 31, 29 obs), Electronics (Nace 33 and 34), Transport Equipment 
(Nace 35 and 36, 13 obs), Machinery&Instruments (Nace 32, 37, 29 obs), 
Food&Beverages (Nace 41 and 42, 28 obs), Textiles (Nace 43, 44 and 45, 32 obs), 





High Tech industry dummy includes NACE2* industries as defined by OECD.  
A total of 714 firms responded, 445 firms innovated in the full sample, 215 firms without missing values. 
*NACE2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community at two digit level 
(Nomenclature Statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) 
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Adoption analysis: the drivers of external technology sourcing strategies 
Next we examine the external sourcing strategy adoption decisions, either in a multinomial 
logit analysis (for the exclusive technology sourcing choices) or in the bivariate probit analysis 
(for the choice of embodied versus disembodied acquisition). There exists very little theory to 
formulate hypotheses on the variables that influence the firm’s decision to opt for different 
modes of technology acquisition and in particular whether this acquisition happens in an 
embodied and/or disembodied form. Since we have no strong a priori expectations on the likely 
effects, the results reported should therefore be considered indicative of important relations 
between the mode of technology acquisition and firm and industry characteristics, and, are 
intended to stimulate further research on the issue. 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) a.o. show that firms with basic R&D capabilities are more likely 
to be engaged in combining own R&D activities and external acquisition activities, as their 
higher absorptive capacity will increase the marginal returns from own R&D in the presence of 
external acquisition, and vice versa. Their variable, Basic R&D Reliance, measures the 
importance, for the innovation process, of information from research institutes and universities 
relative  to the importance of suppliers and customers as an information source for the 
innovation process (see Table 3). We use this variable to proxy for the firm’s reliance on more 
“basic” types of know-how and expect that, following Arora and Gambardella (1990), it might 
affect the marginal returns to all of the external sourcing activities as well. 
Larger firms develop more projects and can benefit from economies of scale and scope in R&D.  
They are therefore more likely to engage in innovation activities in general (Size).  Furthermore, 
higher innovation expenditure, while controlling for size, also increases the likelihood of 
engaging in different innovation activities in general (Innovation Intensity). We also test 
whether obstacles to innovations such as a lack of innovation and technical personnel 
(Resource Limitations) or lack of financial resources (Financial Limitations) influence the firm’s 
decision about the organization of its innovation strategy. A lack of internal resources may 
drive the firm towards external sourcing in general. Finally, when information from 
competitors (Competitor Information) is important, the firm is more likely to be either a follower 
or an imitator with respect to innovation. Therefore, firms in the same industry are more likely 
to catch up by accessing relevant state-of-the-art technology on the external technology 
market, positively affecting the external knowledge acquisition decision. It is not clear a priori 
how each of these variables is affecting the choice of external sourcing strategies in general, or 
whether they particularly favor an embodied and/or a disembodied choice.   
The appropriation regime has been identified, in the theoretical literature, as an important 
factor affecting the (relative) importance of (different) innovation activities for a firm (Teece, 
1986; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). If firms are able to appropriate the benefits from 
innovation, they have more incentives to invest in innovative strategies. This will apply for 
internal as well as external sourcing modes. But in addition, the nature of the appropriation 
mechanisms might matter. If firms rate legal protection of innovations through patents as 
effective, they may be more inclined to buy technology disembodied. Therefore, the effect of 
Effectiveness of IP Protection is expected to have a positive effect, particularly on the DEMB 
decisions. If innovations are easier to protect through strategic measures, such as secrecy, lead 
time or product or process complexity (Effectiveness of Strategic Protection), firms may favor 
own R&D activities and embodied technology acquisitions, avoiding being active on the market 
for disembodied technology acquisition. We would therefore expect Effectiveness of Strategic 
Protection to primarily affect the firm’s EMB decision.   
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Drivers for embodied versus disembodied acquisition: in search of exclusion restrictions  
If we are able to identify exogenous variables that would affect exclusively the choice of only 
one of the external sourcing modes, we can further refine our search for the nature of the 
relationship between embodied and disembodied technology acquisition, i.e. whether it is 
complementary or substitute, using the exclusion restrictions result as discussed above.     
Unfortunately, as the discussion so far has shown, the literature offers little guidance for 
identifying such exclusive variables. As discussed, the nature of the appropriation regime may 
be one such dimension. In addition, we hypothesize that the use of embodied versus 
disembodied technology acquisition will depend on technology life cycle and how well-
developed the market for buying the technology embodied versus disembodied is. A more fluid 
technology market, with a larger number of active buyers and sellers for technologies that are 
already beyond their early pre-paradigm technology life cycle, will have lower transaction cost.  
We therefore expect that firms are more likely to use disembodied (embodied) technology 
acquisition if the market for disembodied (embodied) technology acquisition is more developed.  
We measure the latter by the use of the external technology sourcing activities in our sample at 
the industry level, resp. IndDEMB and IndEMB.  IndDEMB  is expected to have a positive effect 
on DEMB in the bivariate probit analysis. However, if the same variable IndDEMB shows up in 
the  EMB with a positive (negative) effect, then this is consistent with a complementary 
(substitute) relationship between EMB and DEMB buy. A similar story holds for IndEMB, which 
is expected to have a positive effect on EMB, while a positive (negative) coefficient in DEMB is 
reminiscent of a complementary (substitute) relationship between EMB and DEMB.  
 
The econometric results 
Innovative performance results 
The results are presented in Table 4. Next to industry dummies, firm size, innovation intensity 
and export intensity are important variables controlling for firm characteristics in innovation 
performance across different specifications.  The data suggest that small firms (Size) and more 
intensive innovation spenders are more successful in terms of innovation performance. More 
export-oriented firms (Export Intensity) are also more innovation productive, presumably 
because of the more competitive environment they face. Unsurprisingly, perceived lack of 
technological and market opportunities reduces innovation performance. However, these effects 
are not significant, probably because they have a greater effect on the likelihood of being 
innovative in the first place, rather than on the degree of innovativeness.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 13 
Table 4 
Productivity Regressions: dependent variable % Sales from New Products 




























































Industry Dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Complementarity Test: 
DEMB&EMB – DEMBOnly > 
EMBOnly – NoDEMB&EMB 




F(1,195) = 1.51 
(0.110) 
 
F(1,86) = 4.29 
(0.021) 
 





F(20,215) = 13.21*** 
 
F(20,86) = 13.65*** 
  
F(20,89) = 7.53*** 
Coefficients Significant at: 1%***, 5%** and 10%*, standard deviations in brackets. N=215 
OLS (Huber White Sandwich estimator) 
 
Turning to the question of complementarity versus substitutability we find that for the full sample 
the external sourcing activities are substitutes. This effect holds, despite the good performance of 
the DEMB&EMB strategy.  It is due to the high performance of the exclusive choices, particularly 
the  EMBonly strategy. Interestingly there seems to be an important difference between the 
behavior of small firms (less than 250 employees, Regression [2]) and large firms (more than 250 
employees, Regression [3]). For small firms, embodied and disembodied external knowledge 
sourcing activities are substitutes, suggesting that small firms are more constrained to combine 
various external sourcing strategies, or lack the drivers to benefit from any complementarities 
that combining various strategies might yield. For large firms, the evidence goes more in the 
direction of complementarity, but the results are not significant. 
As we only have information for innovation active firms, the coefficients in the productivity 
regression may be biased.  We use a two-stage Heckman correction procedure to check the results 
for sample selection bias.
8 The hypothesis of sample selection is rejected, and the correction does 
                                              
8 Results are not reported and available upon request. The sample selection is for whether firms are innovation active 
or not. In the first stage, the innovation equation is estimated. In a probit model, we regress whether the firm 
innovates on the following independent variables: size, export intensity, a number of variables measuring obstacles 
to innovation (cost, lack of resources, lack of technological/market information, no technological opportunities, lack 
of demand) and industry dummies (see Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999, for a development of this result). From the 
resulting estimation we construct the Heckman correction term (λ) to be included in the productivity regression.  
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not affect our main conclusions. We still confirm the substitutability of embodied and 
disembodied external sourcing activities for small firms. Furthermore, as we have left-censored 
observations on innovation performance, we also performed a Tobit regression.
9 Since we have 
only a limited number of left censored cases, the main results are not affected.    
Multinomial logit results 
Table 5 presents the result of a multinomial logit where we use the external technology sourcing 
strategies, i.e. the exclusive combinations of DEMB and EMB decisions, as the dependent 
variable.
10 As expected, although the overall explanatory power of the model is significant, there 
are very few expected variables that turn out to significantly affect the exclusive choices. The 
multinomial logit results are most interesting in pointing out some significant variables affecting 
the combined choice of DEMB&EMB acquisition, pointing towards drivers for complementarity.  
Basic R&D Reliance although only marginally significant, positively affects the combination of 
both modes of external technology acquisition, supporting the importance of absorptive capacity 
generated by this variable as a driver for complementarity in innovation strategies. Also Size and 
more effective appropriation – legal or strategic – positively affects the combination strategy 
EMB&DEMB. Resource Limitations positively affects the combination strategy, possibly indicating 
that it is precisely firms that combine several external technology sourcing strategies that 
experience this resource constraint. 
Table 5 
Multinomial Logit 






















































































 Pseudo  R
2 = 0.164 
χ
2(33) = 77.90*** 
N = 202 
Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%** , 10%* and 15%
+. Standard 
deviations in brackets. 
 
                                              
9  Innovation performance is measured as a percentage of sales. 24 firms reported 0% of sales from new or 
substantially improved products introduced between 1990 and 1992. Results available from the authors upon request. 
10 The benchmark case is NoEMB&DEMB.  
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Bivariate probit results 
Through an exclusion restriction, a stronger test of the nature of the relation between external 
innovation activities can be performed. However, this requires finding a reasonable excluded 
variable in one of the adoption equations of DEMB or EMB in the bivariate probit. We 
hypothesized that if the market for disembodied (embodied) technology acquisition is better 
developed, the firm is more likely to be engaged in disembodied (embodied) buy. Our results from 
the multinomial logit regression were already consistent with such an exclusion restriction. In the 
bivariate probit results,  IndEMB  significantly increases the likelihood of the firm’s choice of 
EMB, and this holds for both small and large firms. But more interestingly, IndEMB shows up 
significantly negative in the small firm’s choice to acquire technology DEMB, consistent with a 
substitute relationship between EMB and DEMB for small firms, as already found in the 
productivity analysis. For large firms, IndEMB significantly increases the probability of the firm 
buying technology disembodied, supporting a complementary relationship between EMB and 
DEMB for large firms, as was also suggested, but not found to be significant, in the productivity 
analysis. A similar but weaker result holds for the effect of IndDEMB. The industry variable again 
significantly drives the firm’s choice for DEMB acquisition, both for large and small firms.  In 
addition, it affects the firm’s choice to acquire embodied technology, negatively for small firms, 
and positively for large firms. This is again consistent with a substitute relationship for small 
firms, while large firms enjoy a complementary relationship, but these cross-effects fail to show 
up significantly. Also, the different modes of appropriation describe a similar exclusion story. 
Strategic protection significantly affects the EMB decision of small innovating firms and, 
consistent with substitution, also indirectly negatively affects the small firms’ disembodied 
technology acquisition, but these effects are only marginally significant. Also, the results on legal 
protection are suggestive of a substitute relationship for small firms, but again the results are not 
significant. 
  






  Total Sample  Small (<250)  Large (>250) 
 EMB  DEMB  EMB 
  DEMB 
EMB 
DEMB 
































































































































































2(1) = 3.185* 




2(1) = 0.026 




2(1) = 5.67** 
N = 105 
       Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%** and 10%*. Standard deviations in brackets. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this study, we take a closer look at the relationship between various external technology 
acquisition strategies. We distinguish two broad types of technology sourcing decisions of the 
firm. On the one hand, the firm can acquire new technology which is embodied in new 
personnel that is attracted to it. On the other hand, the firm can obtain new technology 
disembodied through a licensing agreement or by R&D contracting. Using the methodology 
developed in Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), we systematically examine the substitute versus 
complementary relationship between these two different types of external technology sourcing. 
Going beyond the mere identification of the relationship, the analysis also focuses on the 
contextual variables affecting this perceived relationship. We use both an innovation 
productivity as well as an adoption approach to test for the nature and the drivers of the 
relationship between the two acquisition modes.   
We test the methodology for a set of innovative companies across all manufacturing sectors, 
drawn from the Community Innovation Survey for Belgium. From the innovative productivity 
analysis, we find that external sourcing, irrespective of the mode, increases innovative 
performance. With respect to the choice between the different external sourcing modes, we find 
that the choice of external sourcing between embodied or disembodied modes is substitutive for 
smaller firms. Smaller firms in particular obtain higher performance from selecting an 
embodied technology acquisition strategy only. Larger firms tend to combine different external 
technology acquisition strategies, but complementarity effects are not significant in our sample. 
Results from the adoption approach confirm the substitute (complement) nature of the 
relationship for small (large) firms, but they also reveal the contextual variables affecting 
complementarity. We find basic R&D Reliance and firm size as components of a firm’s 
absorptive capacity to significantly affect the likelihood of a combined sourcing choice. Also, 
the nature of the appropriation regime and the technology used, particularly how transferable 
the technology is on the market, affects the choice between the various combinations of 
external sourcing activities.      
Given the lack of previous empirical work on this topic, particularly the lack of a rigorous empirical 
framework for testing complementarity/substitutability, the first results on our small Belgian 
sample, although not strongly significant, nevertheless provide some interesting suggestions for 
further research. More empirical work using the same methodology needs to be done to check the 
results’ robustness on larger samples. The EUROSTAT/CIS data proves to be a rich set of 
information, allowing replication of this exercise in other European countries. However, the 
qualitative nature of most of the information limits the analysis, in terms of quantifying innovation 
strategies. But perhaps even more important is the need for more theoretical work to help 
distinguish the drivers for different external technology sourcing modes.  
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